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In Anarchy, State and Utopia, Robert Nozick holds that moral side constraints reflects the underlying Kantian's principle that individuals are ends and not merely means. He also points out that these moral side constraints lead to the libertarian natural rights. In this paper I will analyze the alleged Kantian foundation of Nozick's political philosophy and the conceptual relationship between kantian's conception of dignity and self-ownership principle, which is widely accepted as the last foundation of Nozick's theory of justice. I will conclude that, despite certain similarities, self-ownership and kantian's conception of dignity are conceptually incompatible. Likewise, I will conclude that the concept of self-ownership is a key element in the understanding of Nozick's libertarianism and, therefore, as an exegetic tool of it, it should be preferred over the kantian's concept of dignity. ; En Anarquía, Estado y utopía, Robert Nozick sostiene que los derechos naturales liberales se siguen de las restricciones morales indirectas a la acción y que éstas, a su vez, reflejan el principio kantiano subyacente de que los individuos son fines y no simplemente medios. En el presente trabajo se indaga en los supuestos fundamentos kantianos de la filosofía política de Nozick y en las relaciones que existen entre el concepto kantiano de dignidad y la propiedad sobre sí mismo, concepto este último que suele ser aceptado como el fundamento último de la teoría de la justicia de Nozick. Se concluirá que, pese a ciertas similitudes, el concepto de propiedad sobre sí mismo resulta incompatible con el concepto kantiano de dignidad. Se concluirá, asimismo, que el concepto de propiedad sobre sí mismo ofrece una clave de lectura consistente de la obra política de Nozick y que en consecuencia, para tales fines, debe ser preferido por sobre el concepto kantiano de dignidad.

It is often admitted that the different conceptions of liberalism are distributed along an arch at whose opposite ends stand tolerance and autonomy. In this work, we shall examine two theories which encapsulate these two polar opposites, put forth by Kukathas and Kymlicka, in order to delve into their respective Utopias. We shall sustain that, with the former (the "liberal theory of tolerance"), what is pursued is not, in fact, a Utopia but rather a libertarian dystopia. We shall also sustain that, with the latter (the "liberal theory of multiculturalism"), it can be taken to mean a Utopia in the conventional sense of the word, i.e. a political project that is impossible to put into practice. Based on our analysis and comparison of these two Utopias, we conclude that the different versions of liberalism can be interpreted as a one-of-a-kind Utopia in that it aspires to embrace communities which are actually incompatible among themselves or incompatible with the general framework of liberalism, and act as arbitrator between them. For this very reason, we shall go one step further and sustain that liberalism is, in fact, a Utopia in the sense that it seeks the impossible: that all communities give up their goal to model the State and the whole of society according to their own conception of what is good ; Se suele admitir que las diferentes concepciones del liberalismo se distribuyen a través de un arco en cuyos polos se ubican la tolerancia y la autonomía. En el presente trabajo examinaremos dos teorías que se ubican en los extremos opuestos de ese arco, la de Kukathas y la de Kymlicka, con el objeto de indagar en sus respectivas utopías. Sostendremos que de la primera, "teoría liberal de la tolerancia", se sigue no una utopía, sino más bien una distopía libertaria. Sostendremos que la segunda, "la teoría liberal del multiculturalismo", puede entenderse como una utopía en el sentido usual del término, es decir, como un proyecto político imposible o impracticable. Del análisis y comparación de ambas utopías ...